Anti-Colectivos Content in Post-Election Venezuela

1. Case Description

Following Venezuela’s presidential election on July 28, 2024, the country has been in turmoil. After Venezuela’s election authorities announced that current President Nicolás Maduro had won the election in widely disputed results, thousands of people protested, and Maduro in turn called for an “ iron fist” response. Online, the government has moved to restrict access to some social media platforms and encouraged citizens to report protesters to authorities. Offline, thousands have been detained and more than two dozen killed, with state-supported armed groups known as “colectivos” involved in the crackdown.

In the weeks after the election, Meta’s moderators noted an influx of anti-colectivos content. This has raised critical questions about the balance the company must strike in moderating posts that could contain vital political criticism and raise awareness of human rights abuses in a repressive environment yet may also employ violent language during such a volatile period.

The two cases in this bundle involve videos posted after the July 2024 presidential election and during the ongoing protests that followed. Both posts reference colectivos. In the first case, an Instagram user posted a video in Spanish without a caption. The video appears to be taken from inside an apartment complex showing a group of armed men on motorbikes pulling up to it. A woman can be heard shouting that the colectivos are trying to enter the building. The person filming shouts “Go to hell! I hope they kill you all!” Meta found this content did not violate its Violence and Incitement policy because, in the company’s view, the expression was a conditional or aspirational statement against a violent actor rather than a call to action.

In the second case, a Facebook user shared a video that appears to be taken from a moving motorcycle. It shows a group of men on motorbikes, presumably colectivos, and people running on the street. The man filming shouts that the colectivos are attacking them. The video has a caption in Spanish calling out the security forces for not defending the people and saying that the security forces should go and “kill those damn colectivos.” Meta removed this post under the Violence and Incitement policy as a call to action to commit high-severity violence.

2. Expedited Case Background and Context

Since Maduro came to power in 2013, the country has undergone an economic and political crisis with continued repression of opposition and dissent (UN High Commissioner on Human Rights report on Venezuela, A/HRC/53/54, November 2023) through enforced disappearances and arbitrary detentions, torture, and sexual or gender-based violence. The situation has recently worsened due to the ongoing electoral crisis in the country.

Venezuela held presidential elections on July 28, 2024, with incumbent candidate, President Nicolás Maduro and the opposition Democratic Unitary Platform’s candidate Edmundo González Urrutia, dominating the contest. In the early hours of July 29, 2024, the president of Venezuela’s National Electoral Council (CNE) proclaimed Maduro the winner with no explanation as to how it had counted the votes. The CNE has not published a breakdown of the results from polling stations across the country, as required by Venezuelan law, or other evidence to substantiate this claim.

The results have been widely disputed. The UN Panel of Electoral Experts sent by the UN Secretary-General, at the invitation of the CNE of Venezuela to follow and report on the election process , stated that the CNE’s results reporting “fell short of the basic transparency and integrity measures that are essential to holding credible elections.” The Carter Center, a civil society group that monitors elections and was similarly invited by the CNE to observe the presidential election, also found these “did not meet international standards of electoral integrity and cannot be considered democratic,” and further noted the CNE’s “failure to announce disaggregated results by polling station constitutes a serious breach of electoral principles.”

Thousands have protested Maduro’s claims of victory. Street protests, as well as criticism on social media, in the weeks following the election have been met with fierce repression by the state, with the state-linked colectivos joining this crackdown, inducing a climate of widespread fear. Between July 28 and August 8, in the context of the protests, the UN has reported 23 deaths, mostly by gunfire. The government has also detained more than 2,000 people, including more than 100 children and adolescents. Protesters, leaders, members and supporters of political parties, journalists, and human rights defenders considered or perceived by the authorities to be in opposition, and individuals who participated in protests or expressed their opinions on social media have been targeted and harassed by state forces and colectivos. According to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), the demonstrations have been harshly repressed by state forces and colectivos, and while most of the reported deaths are attributed to state forces, at least six of those are attributed to the colectivos. The Commission further stated that the colectivos “act with the consent, tolerance, or acquiescence of the State.” The UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela, as well as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, have issued statements highlighting and expressing concern about state repression, including violence perpetrated by security forces and the colectivos during these protests.

Since 2019, through various reports on the situation of human rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela ( A/HRC/41/18, A/HRC/44/20, A/HRC/48/19 and A/HRC/53/54), the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) stated that “pro-government armed civilian groups” called colectivos “contribute to [a] system [of targeted repression and persecution on political grounds] by exercising social control in local communities and supporting security forces in repressing demonstrations and dissent.” The OHCHR has documented attacks by armed colectivos against political opponents, demonstrators and journalists, with security forces making “no effort to prevent these attacks,” and has called upon the Venezuelan government to “disarm and dismantle” armed colectivos and “ensure investigations into their crimes.”

Both the UN and Inter-American system Special Rapporteurs on freedom of expression have noted their concerns on the lack of freedom of expression in Venezuela:

"There are worrying limitations on the exercise of freedom of expression in Venezuela, marked by the harassment and persecution of dissident voices, particularly journalists, media workers and independent media outlets, as well as social leaders and human rights defenders. Restrictive measures have also been reported in the digital space in Venezuela, notably via unjustified internet shutdowns and targeted content blocking against independent media outlets. The closure of media outlets, and/or seizure of their equipment, ordered by the government are increasingly limiting the access of citizens to reliable information from independent sources, while accentuating a general environment of self-censorship among the media."

The IACHR and civil society organizations have also noted that following the 2024 presidential elections, there have been reports of harassment and persecution strategies enabled by the use of technology. The government has intensified its digital surveillance and censorship measures, using tools such as VenApp to report on dissenting activities and to dox demonstrators, video surveillance to monitor protests, and patrolling drones to provoke widespread fear.

3. Justification for Expedited Review and Meta’s Response

Meta referred both pieces of content to the Board on August 15, 2024 for a decision on an expedited basis. The Oversight Board’s Bylaws provide for expedited review in “exceptional circumstances, including when content could result in urgent real-world consequences,” and decisions are binding on Meta (Charter, Art. 3, section 7.2; Bylaws, Art. 2, section 2.1.2). The expedited process does not include the extensive research, consultations or public comments that would be undertaken for standard cases. The case is decided on the information available to the Board at the time of deliberation and is decided by a five-member panel without a full vote of the Board.

Meta informed the Board that following the widespread protests against the announced election results and subsequent crackdowns by state actors and colectivos, the company noted an increase in content containing violent speech against colectivos on its platforms. It described colectivos as a general term for armed paramilitary-style groups closely aligned with the regime in Venezuela, that have engaged in clashes with protestors following the election. In this context, colectivos are considered violent actors by the company.

Meta’s policies distinguish between permitted “statements expressing a hope that violent actors will be killed,” and prohibited “calls for action against violent actors.” Through this distinction, internally known as the “violent actor carveout,” the company aims to balance “legitimate discussion on topics of public importance” with “safety concerns.” Meta finds this balance “particularly difficult” in the context of violent threats against colectivos for several reasons: “(1) the heightened voice concerns around people seeking to raise awareness of the colectivos, sometimes in a self-defense context, (2) the limited outlets for free expression, and (3) the role of colectivos in the violent crackdowns against protesters.”

While, in general, the company views “aspirational or conditional threats of violence, including expression of hope that violence will be committed, directed at terrorists and other violent actors” as “non credible, absent specific evidence to the contrary,” it removes “statements of intent or calls for action” to commit violence, irrespective of the target, to ensure the most severe threats are captured. Nonetheless, Meta acknowledged that in the context of Venezuela, the speech at issue in the Facebook post and posts like it express the perspective of people who may feel victimized and unsafe due to the presence of colectivos in their daily lives, and do not have other places to express their fear and frustration, given limited outlets for free expression in the country. At the same time, as the situation in Venezuela remains volatile, the company chose to err on the side of safety and remove the Facebook content applying the letter of its Violence and Incitement policy. While colectivos are not vulnerable targets, but organized, heavily armed groups, the company explained it was concerned that allowing calls for action and statements of intent to kill these groups could nevertheless contribute to a heightened risk of offline violence in an ongoing crisis. Finally, because Meta recognized that the two pieces of content express similar sentiment, it asked for the Board’s input on this distinction, particularly in the context of the post-electoral crisis in Venezuela.

The Board also notes that since 2021, Meta has reduced the distribution of political content on its platforms. This means that, unless a user proactively searches for it, Meta will not recommend this type of content on its platforms. The company defines political content as generally including posts discussing politics, laws, elections and other social topics, and presumably content similar to the posts addressed in this case.

The Board accepted these cases on an expedited basis because of the importance of Meta’s platforms to freedom of expression during the ongoing crisis in Venezuela, where government repression of protests has led to escalating violence and human rights violations. It is important that Meta’s policies and enforcement measures allow for political dissent while not contributing to violence in the country. Both cases fall within the Board’s elections and civic space as well as crisis and conflict strategic priorities.

4. User Submission

Meta notified the users about their respective cases being referred to the Board. The users were invited to submit a statement, but did not provide one

5. Decision

In the first case, the Board upholds Meta’s decision to leave the content on Instagram. In the second case, the Board overturns Meta’s decision to remove the content from Facebook. It finds that in the context of the ongoing crisis in Venezuela, allowing both pieces of content is consistent with Meta’s content policies, values and human rights responsibilities.

5.1 Compliance with Meta’s Content Policies

The Board finds that neither post violates Meta’s content policies. Meta’s Violence and Incitement policy prohibits threats of violence, defined as “statements or visuals representing an intention, aspiration, or call for violence against a target.” Previously, Meta acknowledged in its policy rationale that it presumed that “aspirational or conditional threats of violence” that target violent actors are “non-credible, absent specific evidence to the contrary.” Following the Board's decision in the Haitian Police Station Video case, which noted that this principle was not reflected in a rule, Meta updated its rules on April 25, 2024 to include an exception that allows “threats when shared in awareness-raising or condemning context, […] or certain threats against violent actors, like terrorist groups.” This exception is relevant to the cases, as Meta informed the Board that it considers colectivos as violent actors.

In the first case, the Board agrees with Meta’s decision to keep the content on Instagram. It finds the statement “Go to hell! I hope they kill you all!” to be an aspirational statement that is allowed under the violent actor exception or carveout. The Board agrees with Meta’s assessment that the colectivos have engaged in violent acts against perceived government opponents. The video contains a wish for violence to be carried out against the colectivos, and the post falls squarely within the violent actor exception for aspirational statements.

However, in the second case, the Board disagrees with Meta that the statement that security forces should “kill those damn colectivos” in the Facebook post is a threatening call for action. While the Board understands the rationale underlying Meta’s general approach to threats targeting violent actors, which distinguishes between permitted “statements expressing a hope that violent actors will be killed,” and prohibited “calls for action against violent actors,” it finds this content similar to the Instagram post and, in the context in which it was posted, should also be understood as an aspirational statement eligible for the violent actor exception.

The phrase “kill those damn colectivos” was part of a broader caption calling on the security forces to defend people against violence being perpetrated by paramilitary groups, in the context of a video that shows a group of men, presumably colectivos, on motorbikes, and people running on the street, with a man shouting that the colectivos are attacking them. In response to the Board’s questions, Meta explained that the reference to the security forces in the content did not impact its decision to remove the post as the company does not allow “calls for action targeting violent actors” regardless of who is being asked to perpetrate violence. It further explained that the company is not generally in a position to determine whether actors referenced in a post are authorized to use high-severity violence or whether the use of such force would be justified in a given situation.

The Board understands Meta’s reasons for taking this approach, absent specific context. However, in this case and in the context of the ongoing crisis in Venezuela, the Board finds that the reference to the security forces in the video, and the fact that the user is calling them out for not defending the people from the violence perpetrated by the colectivos, are both relevant to understanding the content as a whole. This context makes the threat, which read literally could be understood as a call for action, not credible, and thus aspirational for several reasons. First, the security forces are linked to the colectivos, and both are engaged in repression of the opposition (see Section 2 above). The security forces are therefore extremely unlikely to attack, or even to be perceived as willing to attack the colectivos in the current context of Venezuela. Second, the person posting the content appears to be fleeing the colectivos. As Meta noted in its referral, anti-colectivos content is arising amid their participation in a violent crackdown on largely non-violent protests. The user posting this content is a private individual, with no significant influence or authority over others (unlike in the Tigray Communication Affairs Bureau decision). Further, the people in the video appear to be the target of violence or harassment by the colectivos, as opposed to a source of violence against the colectivos.

Given the reasons above, while the caption expressly calls for security forces to “kill the damn colectivos,” the statement is better interpreted, with both the context of the video and the wider crisis in Venezuela, as an expression of fear and frustration, on one of the limited avenues for free expression in the country. The Board acknowledges Meta’s concern that allowing this type of expression could contribute to a heightened risk of offline violence in an ongoing crisis. However, given the specific context of Venezuela, in which widespread repression and violence is carried out by state forces jointly with colectivos, and where there are strong restrictions on people’s rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, it is fundamental to allow people to freely express their dissent, anger or desperation, even resorting to strong language. Statements such as those contained in this post are thus better understood in the current context in Venezuela, as non-credible aspirational statements, eligible for the violent actor exception.

The Board acknowledges that in crisis situations, where the stakes are high both in leaving up harmful content and removing protected political speech, Meta should adapt generalized enforcement guidance to be more responsive to the realities of how people targeted by state-backed violence express themselves on its platforms. In this regard, Meta has developed a Crisis Policy Protocol, allowing it to implement time-limited adaptations to its policies and how they are enforced. When, as in this case, Meta designates a crisis situation, it should assess the specific power dynamics of the crisis at hand and the likelihood of real-world harm to determine the extent to which violent expressions of anger or desperation are likely to constitute credible threats or lead to offline violence, or if they should be understood as aspirational, absent specific evidence to the contrary.

The Board believes that the present context in Venezuela justifies the activation of this protocol to ensure Meta respects the voice of protesters and others targeted by state-backed violence. Specifically, there should be an expansion of guidance around how to define “aspirational or conditional statements of violence” against some violent actors. This expansion of enforcement guidance should be subject to regular review, with input from potentially affected groups and relevant stakeholders.

5.2 Compliance with Meta’s Human Rights Responsibilities

The Board finds that keeping the post on Instagram and restoring the post to Facebook aligns with Meta’s human rights responsibilities.

Article 19 of the ICCPR guarantees the freedom to share, seek, and receive information and ideas “of all kinds.” Protected expression includes “political discourse,” commentary on public affairs, and “discussion of human rights,” ( General Comment No. 34, 2011, para. 11; General Comment No. 37, 2020, para. 32). Moreover, government actors are “legitimately subject to criticism and political opposition” ( General Comment No. 34, 2011, para. 38). Access to social media is crucial in Venezuela, where longstanding repression of opposition voices and independent media has only become more acute in the present crisis. As “digital gatekeepers,” social media platforms have a “profound impact” on public access to information ( A/HRC/50/29, para. 90; See Mention of the Taliban in News Reporting, Iran Protest Slogan decisions).

When restrictions on expression are imposed by a state, they must meet the requirements of legality, legitimate aim, and necessity and proportionality (Article 19, para. 3, ICCPR). These requirements are often referred to as the “three-part test.” The Board uses this framework to interpret Meta’s voluntary human-rights commitments, both in relation to the individual content decision under review and what this says about Meta’s broader approach to content governance. In doing so, the Board attempts to be sensitive to how those rights may be different when applied to a private social media company compared to when they are applied to a government. Nonetheless, as the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression has stated, while companies do not have the obligations of governments, “their impact is of a sort that requires them to assess the same kind of questions about protecting their users’ right to freedom of expression” (report A/74/486, para. 41).

The principle of legality requires that rules restricting freedom of expression should be accessible and sufficiently clear to provide guidance as to what is permitted and what is not. The Board finds that, as applied to these cases, the violent actor exception or carveout to Meta’s incitement rules is sufficiently clear, especially after the April 25, 2024 updates. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, in crisis situations, Meta should adapt its generalized enforcement guidance to be more responsive to contextual factors that impact how people targeted by state-backed violence express themselves on its platforms.

Similarly, the Board has previously found that in seeking to “prevent potential offline violence” by removing content that poses “a genuine risk of physical harm or direct threats to public safety,” the Violence and Incitement Community Standard serves the legitimate aims of protecting the right to life (Article 6, ICCPR) and the right to security of person (Article 9 ICCPR, General Comment No. 35, para. 9; See Reporting on Pakistani Parliament Speech, Tigray Communication Affairs Bureau, Hostages Kidnapped From Israel, Iran Protest Slogan decisions).

The principle of necessity and proportionality provides that any restrictions on freedom of expression “must be appropriate to achieve their protective function; they must be the least intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve their protective function; [and] they must be proportionate to the interest to be protected” ( General Comment No. 34, para. 34).

The Board finds that it was not necessary to remove either post. As detailed in Section 5.1 above, various contextual factors made clear that neither post should be understood as a call to others to engage in violence, and, importantly, it was neither imminent nor likely that violence would result from these statements.

The people who posted the content are private individuals sharing their direct experiences of the violence or harassment the colectivos are inflicting on them. In this context, their posts can be understood as condemning the security forces (in the Facebook case) and a cry of fear and desperation, calling for help in a time of crisis and uncertainty (in both). Both posts depict and describe how the colectivos are attacking or harassing people and criticize these actions, and in the context of Venezuela, the imminence or even likelihood of harm posed by content like this is low. The targets of aspirational violence are state-backed forces that have contributed to the longstanding repression of civic space and other human rights violations in Venezuela, including in the present post-election crisis. By contrast, the civilian population has largely been the target of human rights abuses.

As previously mentioned in this decision, the posts were published in the context of high social and political tension characterized by a wave of repression following the highly disputed results of the 2024 presidential election. In both posts, which express very similar sentiments, private individuals resort to strong language to express their fear, anger and desperation regarding the actions of the colectivos, and the lack of response by the security forces (in the Facebook case). The removal of content such as the one in the Facebook case, which in context does not constitute a credible threat, has a significant negative impact on the people denouncing the actions of colectivos, who face enormous constraints on free speech and on holding state and state-backed actors accountable.

The Board is also deeply concerned that in the context of Venezuela, the company’s policy to reduce the distribution of political content could undermine the ability of users expressing political dissent and raising awareness about the situation in Venezuela to reach the widest possible audience. Should this be the case, the Board believes that a policy lever could be included in its Crisis Policy Protocol to ensure that political content, especially around elections and post-electoral protests, is eligible for the same reach as non-political content.

Finally, the Board has repeatedly affirmed the importance of evaluating context to ensure political speech is protected, especially in countries in conflict or that face significant constraints on freedom of expression, as in Venezuela (see the Colombia Protests, Iran Protest Slogan and Call for Women’s Protest in Cuba decisions). Meta should therefore also use the Crisis Policy Protocol to enable responses to situations like those seen in Venezuela. Particularly in contexts with repression of democratic dissent, when the threats appear to be non-credible, and the likelihood of such content leading to offline violence is low, Meta should adjust its policy and enforcement guidance accordingly, subject to regular review, with input from potentially affected groups and relevant stakeholders.

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