

Public Comment Appendix for

2023-004-FB-MR

Case number

Case description

In October 2022, a Facebook user posted a video on a page which appears to be concerned with alleged war crimes committed by Azerbaijan during the recently reignited Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In the caption, which is in English and Turkish, the user says that the video depicts Azerbaijani soldiers torturing Armenian prisoners of war. The video begins with a warning that it is only suitable for people over the age of 18. The warning has been added by the user who made the video, rather than Meta. The English text reads **“Stop Azerbaijani terror. The world must stop the aggressors.”** The video shows people who appear to be Azerbaijani soldiers searching through rubble. The video has been edited so that their faces cannot be seen. They find people in the rubble who are described in the caption as Armenian soldiers. Some appear to be injured, others appear dead. They pull one soldier from the rubble, who cries out in pain. His face is visible and he appears injured. An unseen person, potentially the person filming, shouts in Russian at an apparently injured soldier sitting on the ground, telling him to stand up. He attempts to do so. The content has been viewed fewer than 100 times, has received fewer than 10 reactions, and has not been shared or reported by anyone.

Meta’s [Coordinating Harm and Promoting Crime Community Standard](#) prohibits “content that reveals the identity or location of a prisoner of war in the context of an armed conflict,” including by sharing imagery. According to the publicly available change log, which records changes Meta has made to its Community Standards, the company introduced this rule on 4 May 2022. Meta says that the content would ordinarily have been removed under that policy, as it shows the faces of the soldiers. However, it left the content on the platform under its [newsworthiness allowance](#). Meta said “that the public interest in seeing the content outweighed the risk to the safety and dignity of the prisoners of war.” Meta applied a warning screen to the content, marking it as “disturbing,” under its [Violent and Graphic Content Community Standard](#). The video was added to a Media Matching Service bank, which automatically identifies matching content and places a warning screen over it.

Meta referred the case to the Board, stating that it is difficult as it involves balancing the benefits of raising awareness of violence against prisoners of war against the

potential harm caused by revealing their identity. Meta asked the Board to consider **whether Meta’s decision** to allow the content represents an appropriate balancing of its values of “Safety,” “Dignity,” and “Voice,” and **whether it is consistent with** international human rights principles.


The Board selected this case to explore Meta’s policies and practices in moderating content that depicts prisoners of war. This case falls within the Board’s “crisis and conflict situations” [strategic priority](#).

The user was invited to explain the context of the content with the Board, after it selected the case. They did not reply by the given deadline.

The Board would appreciate public comments that address:

- How social media platforms should moderate content depicting prisoners of war, including content that may originally have been created for the purpose of propaganda, which is now being shared with additional context to raise awareness of abuses.
- The potential public interest value, and potential harms, of allowing content depicting prisoners of war on social media platforms.
- How international humanitarian law (also known as the law of armed conflict) **should inform Meta’s human rights responsibilities when** moderating content depicting prisoners of war.
- How Meta could mitigate the risks of harm caused by either allowing or removing content depicting prisoners of war.
- How Meta should approach preserving content depicting potential war crimes.
- Insights into the socio-political context regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, in particular regarding the treatment of prisoners of war.

In its decisions, the Board can issue policy recommendations to Meta. While recommendations are not binding, Meta must respond to them within 60 days. As such, the Board welcomes public comments proposing recommendations that are relevant to these cases.




Public Comment Appendix for
2023-004-FB-MR
Case number

The Oversight Board is committed to bringing diverse perspectives from third parties into the case review process. To that end, the Oversight Board has established a public comment process.

Public comments respond to case descriptions based on the information provided to the Board by users and Facebook as part of the appeals process. These case descriptions are posted before panels begin deliberation to provide time for public comment. As such, case descriptions reflect neither the Board's assessment of a case, nor the full array of policy issues that a panel might consider to be implicated by each case.

To protect the privacy and security of commenters, comments are only viewed by the Oversight Board and as detailed in the [Operational Privacy Notice](#). All commenters included in this appendix gave consent to the Oversight Board to publish their comments. For commenters who did not consent to attribute their comments publicly, names have been redacted. To withdraw your comment, please email contact@osbadmin.com.

To reflect the wide range of views on cases, the Oversight Board has included all comments received except those clearly irrelevant, abusive or disrespectful of the human and fundamental rights of any person or group of persons and therefore violating the [Terms for Public Comment](#). Inclusion of a comment in this appendix is not an endorsement by the Oversight Board of the views expressed in the comment. The Oversight Board is committed to transparency and this appendix is meant to accurately reflect the input we received.



Public Comment Appendix for

2023-004-FB-MR

Case number

41

Number of Comments

Regional Breakdown

1	3	25	0
Asia Pacific & Oceania	Central & South Asia	Europe	Latin America & Caribbean
4	0	8	
Middle East and North Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa	United States & Canada	

2023-004-FB-MR

Case number

PC-11027

Public comment number

Europe

Region

Nareg

Commenter's first name

Terzian

Commenter's last name

English

Commenter's preferred language

DID NOT PROVIDE

Organization

No

Response on behalf of organization

Short summary provided by the commenter

People must be made aware of horrible acts such as war crimes. Social Media platforms are an invaluable channel for this. Such videos/visuals should naturally be made safe (e.g. through blurring), marked for sensitive content, and accompanied by explanations in order to avoid interpretations or instrumentalizations. Some platforms are often the only way such content reaches Human Rights NGOs or even Courts, to be used for prosecution of criminals. Do not allow such acts to remain hidden - let them be known.

Full Comment

(Same as above) People must be made aware of horrible acts such as war crimes. Social Media platforms are an invaluable channel for this. Such videos/visuals should naturally be made safe (e.g. through blurring), marked for sensitive content, and accompanied by explanations in order to avoid interpretations or instrumentalizations. Some platforms are often the only way such content reaches Human Rights NGOs or even Courts, to be used for prosecution of criminals. Do not allow such acts to remain hidden - let them be known.

Link to Attachment

No Attachment

2023-004-FB-MR

Case number

PC-11029

Public comment number

United States and Canada

Region

Rachel

Commenter's first name

Chappell

Commenter's last name

English

Commenter's preferred language

DID NOT PROVIDE

Organization

No

Response on behalf of organization

Short summary provided by the commenter

Azerbaijan's war crimes are numerous and archived at www.azeriwarcrimes.org
There is a page full of graphic killings to include beheadings of civilians. Elderly civilians, even. Every day, they threaten a new invasion war against the civilian population of Artsakh. The US and Israel are funding and arming this butchery.

Full Comment

Please simply go to azeriwarcrimes.org and view it with your own eyes. We don't have cameras inside the POW torture chambers inside Baku, but we do have video proof of soldiers and civilians being tortured, murdered and mutilated. Further, Anush Apetyan was an Armenian soldier who was raped, mutilated and murdered even though she was defenseless against the attack. Video after video shows them shooting soldiers who have surrendered and doing far worse things. What more does our government need to see?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_of_Anush_Apetyan

<https://tvpworld.com/63102249/video-of-azeri-soldiers-allegedly-killing-armenian-pows-surfaces-on-social-media>

Link to Attachment

No Attachment

2023-004-FB-MR

Case number

PC-11031

Public comment number

United States and Canada

Region

Nune

Commenter's first name

Piloshyan

Commenter's last name

English

Commenter's preferred language

DID NOT PROVIDE

Organization

No

Response on behalf of organization

Short summary provided by the commenter

AZ(created 100 years ago) does everything in its power to destroy every last person or thing identified as “Armenian.”**In conjunction with that,they spread false info** online to confuse people into thinking the destroyed **AM** history never existed. Show evidence of azerbaijani crimes, and prevent Azerbaijan from distorting true history and covering up their current campaign of ethnic cleansing Armenians from ancient Armenian land. #ArmenianGenocide

Full Comment

Azerbaijan (created 100 years ago) does everything in its power to destroy every last **person or thing identified as “Armenian.” In conjunction with that, they spread** false info online to confuse people into thinking the destroyed Armenian history never existed. Please show evidence of azerbaijani crimes, and prevent Azerbaijan from distorting true history and covering up their current campaign of ethnic cleansing Armenians from ancient Armenian land. Azerbaijanis make up a false account of history and accusations... **Please allow Armenians the opportunity to fight back with the truth.** #ArmenianGenocide

Link to Attachment

No Attachment

2023-004-FB-MR

Case number

PC-11032

Public comment number

United States and Canada

Region

Vaheh

Commenter's first name

Gerami

Commenter's last name

English

Commenter's preferred language

Truth And Accountability League

Organization

Yes

Response on behalf of organization

Short summary provided by the commenter

Hello, I am a journalist, radio host, and documentary filmmaker, based in Los Angeles. I am also the founder of the Truth And Accountability League (TAAL). I used the 'Armenian Prisoner of War' video in my documentary, 'Motherland.' My first question is whether there are any Armenian-Americans on your Oversight Board. Regarding the video, not a single person who watched 'Motherland' complained about the video or other ones that I used in the film. I don't think the 'Armenian Prisoner of War' video should be censored. I appreciate your time and consideration and am available if you have any questions. Thank you, and kind regards, vic

Full Comment

Hello, I am a journalist, radio host, and documentary filmmaker, based in Los Angeles. I am also the founder of the Truth And Accountability League (TAAL), a 501©3 non-profit advocacy organization that monitors and confronts bias, disinformation, propaganda, and defamation of the Armenian people and culture at the level of media, including social media, academics, intelligentsia, and public policy. We are very similar to the Anti-Defamation League, GLAAD, and NAACP. I used the 'Armenian Prisoner of War' video in my documentary, 'Motherland.' My documentary is an 'Official Selection' in (76) film festivals and has won (39) awards. It was shortlisted for Film Independent's 'Spirit Awards' and was Oscar-qualified and available in The Academy's 'Screening Room' for its members. My first question is whether there are any Armenian-Americans on your Oversight Board. Given Azerbaijan Laundromat and Caviar Diplomacy, and Turkiye's expenditure to be a member of many boards such as yours, I would like to see some transparency about

your members. I put myself up as a candidate to join your organization. Regarding the video, not a **single person who watched 'Motherland' complained about the video or other ones that I used in the film.** I don't think the 'Armenian Prisoner of War' video should be censored. I appreciate your time and consideration and am available if you have any questions. Thank you, and kind regards, vic

[Link to Attachment](#)

No Attachment

2023-004-FB-MR

Case number

PC-11033

Public comment number

United States and Canada

Region

Withheld

Commenter's first name

Withheld

Commenter's last name

English

Commenter's preferred language

Withheld

Organization

No

Response on behalf of organization

Short summary provided by the commenter

Violent content allowing and promoting Armenophobia and furthering Armenian Genocide efforts of Azerbaijan.

Full Comment

The clashes that took place in September 2022 were not in Nagorno-Karabakh, were not in any disputed territory and are separate from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Those attacks were in sovereign, internationally recognized Armenian territory. Also, allowing such inhumane content to be uploaded to Facebook, to be glorified and spread on Facebook allows genocidal and Armenophobic rhetoric to spread.

Link to Attachment

No Attachment

2023-004-FB-MR

Case number

PC-11034

Public comment number

United States and Canada

Region

Withheld

Commenter's first name

Withheld

Commenter's last name

English

Commenter's preferred language

Withheld

Organization

No

Response on behalf of organization

Short summary provided by the commenter

Videos like this should be allowed to raise awareness of the issues.

Full Comment

While seeing violence, pain, torture and death is difficult. Sometimes these kinds of videos, those as a result of war or unprovoked attacks by nations or genocide are supremely important in documenting and spreading the word about the atrocities. **I feel that Facebook's allowance of this kind of video** is right and important in the fight against war, inhumane treatment of people, and sometimes even for bringing legal charges against the perpetrators. Please continue to allow these kinds of videos.

Link to Attachment

No Attachment

2023-004-FB-MR

Case number

PC-11046

Public comment number

Europe

Region

Rose

Commenter's first name

Akopyan

Commenter's last name

English

Commenter's preferred language

Armenia Love

Organization

Yes

Response on behalf of organization

Short summary provided by the commenter

My comments will concern Armenia issues and our liberty and correctness, we should help the truth come out. I will stand for it and hope that someone else will hear our voices of justice and love to our people an God. We will do everything possible and impossible to make it.

Full Comment

As you've already understood, I followed the link to this page to write my opinion and pitch in if I have such an opportunity. I am talking on behalf of my people, Armenians, we are always together with God, so we know that the truth is with us. It **absolutely. We will spread this information and as I've already mentioned, THE TRUTH.** I expect that other people's will pay their attention to the global problem we handle. It is okey not to feel it but you can help us distantly just because we all live on Earth and make this life better only if we unite for it. We can create such a good reality but we also need to get rid of unrighteous people who reject their fault, who just lie to the whole world with no consciousness. We will win. Ourselves and this World. Well, my message is to make you aware of the fact that our people are **being suffered from Azerbaijan's government who doesn't even care our well-being.**

Link to Attachment

[PC-11046](#)

2023-004-FB-MR

Case number

PC-11049

Public comment number

United States and Canada

Region

Aram

Commenter's first name

Stepanian

Commenter's last name

English

Commenter's preferred language

DID NOT PROVIDE

Organization

No

Response on behalf of organization

Short summary provided by the commenter

Instagram and Facebook are blocking publications about Armenian pows who are
prisoned by Azerbaijan, publications about Azerbaijani war criminals who are killed
a lot of people

Full Comment

-

Link to Attachment

No Attachment

2023-004-FB-MR

Case number

PC-11050

Public comment number

Europe

Region

Arsen

Commenter's first name

Aloyan

Commenter's last name

English

Commenter's preferred language

DID NOT PROVIDE

Organization

No

Response on behalf of organization

Short summary provided by the commenter

I think the algorithm should stop labeling all 18+ videos the same. For spreading awareness about War Crimes it might be a good idea to let a portion of video be played, before the 18+ screen appears, to create its own version. Maybe to show video muted automatically, because sound can disturb some vulnerable people. I also think in that videos links should be clickable, to spread awareness and additional information.

Full Comment

I think the algorithm should stop labeling all 18+ videos the same. For spreading awareness about War Crimes it might be a good idea to create its own version, maybe with changed text, or more insightful explanation on why this video is 18+, also it would get peoples attention iv video would start playing, but a few seconds later a sensitive content screen would appear, with a thorough explanation on what is goong to happen next in the video. That explanation should be written by a person who uploaded video. Maybe show video muted automatically, because sound can disturb some vulnerable people. I also think in that videos links should be clickable, to spread awareness and additional information.

Link to Attachment

No Attachment

2023-004-FB-MR

Case number

PC-11054

Public comment number

Europe

Region

Withheld

Commenter's first name

Withheld

Commenter's last name

Russian

Commenter's preferred language

Withheld

Organization

No

Response on behalf of organization

Short summary provided by the commenter

Распространение информации о пленных может помочь сохранить их жизни и здоровье и предотвратить будущие преступления, а также привлечь к ответственности за злодеяния.

Full Comment

Здравствуйте! Мои комментарии следующие: 1) Любые материалы (с частично заблюренными сценами убийства и насилия) с военнопленными не должны блокироваться, т.к. распространение таких материалов это один из немногих способов информирования широкой международной общественности о совершаемых военных преступлениях и, возможно, предотвращения будущих преступлений. Если материалы будут блокироваться, то мир, скорее всего, не узнает о совершаемых злодеяниях и будут совершены новые. 2) Потенциальный общественный интерес - это привлечение виновных к ответственности и предотвращение новых преступлений, ведь подобное может повториться в любом уголке мира. Вред может быть только для чувствительных лиц с неустойчивой психикой и если ролик сфальсифицирован, т.е. распространяет ложную информацию. 3) Основная задача международного гуманитарного права это сохранение жизни и здоровья человека. Поэтому если распространение материал даже теоретически может предотвратить будущий урон человеку, то нужно исходить из этой задачи, а не из тайны персональных данных и прочего. Кроме того, публикация может сохранить жизнь и здоровье военнопленного, т.к. после публикации нельзя скрыть факт наличия пленения данного человека, например, для Международного Красного Креста. 4) Публикацию необходимо проверять на предмет фальсификации, что касается удаления, то

как вариант после удаления публикации Meta может самостоятельно или передав иным организациям или совместно с ними изучить ролик на предмет фальсификации и если он реальный, то обязательно передать в международные инстанции для расследования и принятия решения. Обо всём этом нужно обязательно извещать пользователей сети, если ролик удалён. 5) Возвращение всех военнопленных указано в трёхстороннем договоре между Арменией, Азербайджаном и Россией. И если Армения вернула всех пленных, то Азербайджан не выполняет данный пункт договора, продолжая удерживать десятки военнопленных. Кроме того, президент Азербайджана не скрывает своих территориальных претензий на суверенную территорию Армении, угрожая будущей войной. Есть факты использования Азербайджаном в войне боевиков и террористов из других стран. Азербайджан угрожает этническими чистками как армянам Карабаха так и в будущей войне между Арменией и Азербайджаном, если она случится. Есть задокументированные факты, пропагандируемой азербайджанским государством, армянофобии в самом Азербайджане и среди азербайджанских диаспор.

[Link to Attachment](#)

No Attachment

2023-004-FB-MR

Case number

PC-11087

Public comment number

Middle East and North Africa

Region

Garren

Commenter's first name

Jansezian

Commenter's last name

English

Commenter's preferred language

DID NOT PROVIDE

Organization

No

Response on behalf of organization

Short summary provided by the commenter

The proliferation and distribution of graphically violent abuse committed by Azerbaijani soldiers against Armenian soldiers and citizens is unacceptable. Asking for decent moderation of your website is in no way a call for censorship of any kind. Maybe Meta and the Board can do their job for once and actually become socially productive instead of a dumpster heap of misinformation for the sake of your profits.

Full Comment

The proliferation and distribution of graphically violent abuse committed by Azerbaijani soldiers against Armenian soldiers and citizens is unacceptable. Asking for decent moderation of your website is in no way a call for censorship of any kind. Maybe Meta and the Board can do their job for once and actually become socially productive instead of a dumpster heap of misinformation for the sake of your profits. Flagrant abuse of human rights being filmed and distributed like a meme or otherwise viral video is completely unacceptable. I sincerely believe Meta has the capacity to deal with not only this issue but the many problems you seemingly choose to ignore (misinformation, violent rhetoric against the LGBTQ community, etc). I know, doing something that is not entirely based on profit is anathema to you all but this is real life, not the stupid Meta-verse. Get it together.

Link to Attachment

No Attachment

2023-004-FB-MR

Case number

PC-11096

Public comment number

Europe

Region

Chantal

Commenter's first name

Joris

Commenter's last name

English

Commenter's preferred language

ARTICLE 19

Organization

Yes

Response on behalf of organization

Short summary provided by the commenter

In this public comment to the Oversight Board, ARTICLE 19 addresses Q1 to 5. In armed conflicts, Meta has an obligation to respect international humanitarian law (IHL), including when moderating content. It should also respect international human rights law (IHRL) as applicable during armed conflicts. When moderating content depicting prisoners of war (POWs), Meta should follow International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) guidance and conduct a case-by-case assessment **that accounts for the content's public interest nature, prevents misuse for propaganda purposes and protects the POW in question.** To that end, Meta should explore with the ICRC the possibility to create and fund a standing mechanism to jointly determine appropriate actions.

Full Comment

Overall, ARTICLE 19 observes that the present case raises several complex and underexplored questions, including how freedom of expression applies during armed conflicts and the relationship between social media companies and IHL. It is not feasible to address these questions in their entirety in this submission. Some of our observations should be viewed as preliminary. We are exploring these matters as part of an upcoming policy recommendation on freedom of expression in armed conflicts and are ready to continue engaging with Meta on these issues. We urge Meta to obtain legal advice on its obligations under IHL and to engage with humanitarian actors, including the ICRC, and civil society in States experiencing armed conflicts. Q3. Although States are the primary duty-bearers under IHL, Meta also has an obligation to respect IHL, including when moderating content. In its 2006 guide on Business and international humanitarian law, the ICRC states that

“Despite the sometimes complex overlap with [IHRL], [IHL] retains various distinct characteristics. Perhaps the most fundamental one [...] is that [IHRL] is traditionally understood as only binding on States – although this position is challenged by some human rights advocates – while [IHL] binds both State and non-State actors. [...] A business enterprise carrying out activities that are closely linked to an armed **conflict must also respect [IHL]**”. Which IHL rules apply to a given piece of content will depend on whether the armed conflict is international or non-international (see our submission to the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and relevant ICRC resources). For example, “prisoner of war” is a special status afforded by the Third Geneva Convention (GC III) only to combatants in international armed conflicts. Meta further has to consider that IHRL – including freedom of expression – continues to apply during armed conflicts and that it should respect IHRL as stated by the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. If there is a conflict between an IHRL and an IHL norm, priority should be given to the (*lex specialis*) norm that is more specific. What this means for content that contains **disinformation or “hate speech”** is underexplored. When it comes to the depiction of POWs, existing guidance is more detailed. Q1, Q2, Q4, Q5. The ICRC explains that allowing content depicting POWs on social media could expose the former to harm and endanger their humane treatment, protected by Article 13 of GC III. More specifically, Article 13(2) of GC III provides that “[POWs] must at all times be protected, particularly [...] against insults and public curiosity.” The ICRC Commentary states that “[i]n modern conflicts, the prohibition also covers [...] the disclosure of photographic and video images [...]”. If a POW is identifiable in the content – as in the present case – it could expose them to abuse. Even upon their release, having fallen into enemy hands can cause violence against them. The distribution of such images for propaganda purposes can also negatively affect the manner in which hostilities are conducted and undermine the possibility of reaching a peaceful settlement. These risks are multiplied when content is posted on social media and may become viral. However, the prohibition in Article 13(2) of GC III is not absolute. Documenting the manner in which hostilities are conducted should not be unduly restricted as it can raise public awareness of abuses and assist accountability efforts. Meta must take these issues into account when dealing with **content which “appears to be concerned with alleged war crimes” as in the present case**. The ICRC promotes a balanced case-by-case assessment that takes account of the public interest nature of content **while respecting a POW’s dignity**. Whilst ARTICLE 19 is fully aware of the complexity of such a balancing exercise, we submit **that these considerations should guide Meta’s content moderation policies and enforcement**. This should apply irrespective of the user who posted the content in question. While a user sharing depictions of POWs may not necessarily be violating IHL themselves – for instance in the present case we do not know the extent of the **users’ obligations under IHL** – it does not change the fact that the content may put POWs at risk and should thus be moderated accordingly. As for mitigating risks in

this regard, the ICRC calls on social media companies to employ the same professional practices as traditional media outlets. If there is a compelling reason to **publish content depicting POWs, they may for instance “blur images, alter voices, and use other methods of concealing identities to protect their dignity and ensure their safety”**. More broadly, **ARTICLE 19 suggests that** – to the extent feasible – it may be necessary to contextualise posts depicting POWs to counter any misuse for propaganda purposes. In reality, however, it will be difficult for Meta to determine whether a specific piece of content is shared for propaganda purposes or to raise public awareness about the conduct of hostilities. It may also not be feasible for Meta to assess the intent behind the publication. Plus, any negative effects may happen irrespective of the intent of the user sharing the content. Therefore, we submit that Meta should explore with the ICRC the possibility to create and fund a standing mechanism between Meta and the ICRC to jointly assess the context and nature of specific posts and determine appropriate actions. If content depicting POWs is removed, Meta should ensure that this does not stand in the way of protecting POWs or broader accountability efforts. It should closely cooperate with the ICRC to assess how information on identifiable POWs should best be handled. Finally, it should take appropriate measures to preserve evidence of international crimes and cooperate with relevant accountability mechanisms.

Link to Attachment

[PC-11096](#)

2023-004-FB-MR

Case number

PC-11106

Public comment number

Europe

Region

SHUSHANIK

Commenter's first name

AGADZHANYAN

Commenter's last name

English

Commenter's preferred language

DID NOT PROVIDE

Organization

No

Response on behalf of organization

Short summary provided by the commenter

Azeris crimes should be forbidden from social media

Full Comment

Azeris crimes should be forbidden from social media

Link to Attachment

No Attachment

2023-004-FB-MR

Case number

PC-11107

Public comment number

Europe

Region

Людмила

Commenter's first name

Амирджанян

Commenter's last name

Russian

Commenter's preferred language

DID NOT PROVIDE

Organization

No

Response on behalf of organization

Short summary provided by the commenter

Не нужно удалять контент с военнопленными, в том числе армян, так как публичное разглашение может спасти их жизни.

Full Comment

Не нужно удалять и блокировать контент, случаях, когда пользователи публикуют военнопленных и их пленителей или без них, с призывом спасти их жизни, так как такой контент часто под. цензурой и СМИ и телевизор его не показывают в интересах той или иной политической силы и страны. Но благодаря придания огласки к данной проблеме можно спасти жизни военнопленных армян. Хочу указать, что армянская сторона выполнила все договоренности и вернула всех военнопленных азербайджанцев, а Азербайджан до сих пор не вернул пленных армян и нам ничего не известно об их судьбах. Президент Азербайджана Ильхам Алиев открыто угрожает территориальной целостности Армении, называя ее города землями Азербайджана, это сигнализирует нам о том, что будет новая война, начатая опять азербайджанской стороной. Поэтому так важна поддержка в соцсетях в таких важных вопросах, как проблема с военнопленными. Лица пленителей и тех, кто издевается над пленными закрывать не нужно.

Link to Attachment

No Attachment

2023-004-FB-MR

Case number

PC-11109

Public comment number

Europe

Region

Diana

Commenter's first name

Balasanian

Commenter's last name

English

Commenter's preferred language

Independent researcher

Organization

No

Response on behalf of organization

Short summary provided by the commenter

I am concerned about blurring the faces of the aggressors and leaving the face of the victim visible. This video is violent and shows the hatred of the azerbaijani soldiers towards Armenians, and it should be available to fact-checkers and journalists, but the faces of the Armenian soldiers should not be visible as it violates their human rights in every possible way.

Full Comment

The increasing hatred and violence against Armenian military and civil population on behalf of azerbaijani government has received some international coverage in the recent years, and it is very concerning to see discrimination and double standards in social media. Thus, in the video in question, the Azernaijani soldiers' faces are blurred, and the faces of the victims are clearly visible. The authors of the video clearly wanted to show their hatred and violent behaviour towards the Armenians in order to spread terror and panic among Armenians, but they did not want to be held accountable for their actions as war criminals. This is why I think this video uses double standards, which is the usual attitude of the Azerbaijani forces and government. I think this video should be available to fact-checkers and journalists, but not to azerbaijani users who rejoice in their violent actions. I also insist that the faces of all the people in the video should be blurrrred so that their right to dignity and privacy can be protected. This violent content has some value as proof of the barbaric actions of the azerbaijani military forces, so I don't think it should be removed, but the faces in the video should not be visible.

Link to Attachment

[PC-11109](#)

2023-004-FB-MR

Case number

PC-11117

Public comment number

Europe

Region

Arevik

Commenter's first name

Ayriyan

Commenter's last name

English

Commenter's preferred language

Production

Organization

Yes

Response on behalf of organization

Short summary provided by the commenter

More than a hundred illegally detained prisoners of war are now in Azerbaijan, it is terrible to imagine what is happening to them, every day their life is in the balance. The parents exhausted themselves, the prisoners themselves were in a terrible state. They are illegally judged, sent to prison, mocked and covered up. All this should fall under a military tribunal, but Aliyev quickly turns these cases, and the proceedings take too long. It has already been established that they are being held illegally, but for some reason, none of the representatives of the world elite imposes sanctions against Azerbaijan. <https://azeriwarcrimes.org/atrocities/>

Full Comment

This also applies to the aggravation of new escalations of the Baku regime in relation to Armenia/Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh), which are taking place these days. The world should not be silent, because the silence of one crime is followed by another! We ask you to ensure freedom of speech for the Armenian segment of these social networks. networks, since the Armenian economy is now unstable and forced to fight for its rights and freedoms, especially when the escalation of the armed actions of the Azeris against Armenia and Artsakh and in the issue of Armenian prisoners of war begins. Please give us the opportunity to raise these issues and write about it freely so that we are not blocked on these social media platforms! Sincerely, Arevik!

Link to Attachment

[PC-11117](#)

2023-004-FB-MR

Case number

PC-11128

Public comment number

Europe

Region

Chiara

Commenter's first name

Gabriele

Commenter's last name

English

Commenter's preferred language

TRIAL International

Organization

Yes

Response on behalf of organization

Short summary provided by the commenter

TRIAL International strongly believes in the importance of preserving content depicting potential international crimes in order to facilitate ongoing and future investigations and prosecutions. TRIAL International recommends Meta to: Being transparent over criteria of identification, removal, archiving of relevant content and its supply as potential evidence; Establishing or participating to independent mechanisms preserving potential evidence of international crimes; Proactively collaborating with law enforcement agencies and international justice mechanisms; Engaging in a mutually beneficial cooperation with civil society organizations.

Full Comment

TRIAL International is a non-governmental organization fighting impunity for international crimes and supporting victims in their quest for justice. TRIAL International takes an innovative approach to the law, paving the way to justice for survivors of unspeakable sufferings. The organization provides legal assistance, investigates and litigates cases, develops local capacity and pushes the human rights agenda forward. Over the past 20 years, TRIAL International has represented over 6,500 victims before national, regional and international bodies and trained more than 2,400 lawyers, human rights defenders, judicial actors, journalists and members of civil society on international human rights protection mechanisms, victim representation and the investigation and prosecution of international crimes. TRIAL International wishes to submit a Public Comment to the Oversight Board replying to the following issue: How Meta should approach preserving content depicting potential war crimes. TRIAL International strongly believes in the importance of preserving content depicting potential international crimes in order

to facilitate ongoing and future investigations and prosecutions. Taking into account the specific facts of the case, which include potential acts of torture and other human rights violations, TRIAL International recommends that Meta approaches the preservation of content depicting potential international crimes by:

- Implementing an independent and impartial policy, in accordance with, and informed by, applicable laws – including international human rights, humanitarian and criminal law;
- Being transparent over criteria of identification, removal, archiving of relevant content and its supply as potential evidence;
- Establishing or participating to independent mechanisms preserving potential evidence of international crimes for sharing purposes with relevant authorities and dealing with requests of access to, and supply of, the relevant contents;
- Proactively collaborating with law enforcement agencies and international justice mechanisms;
- Engaging in a mutually beneficial cooperation with civil society organizations documenting international crimes.

Please find the full text of the Public Comment submitted by TRIAL International in the document attached.

Link to Attachment

[PC-11128](#)

2023-004-FB-MR

Case number

PC-11129

Public comment number

Europe

Region

Narmina

Commenter's first name

Mammadova

Commenter's last name

English

Commenter's preferred language

DID NOT PROVIDE

Organization

No

Response on behalf of organization

Short summary provided by the commenter

Meta should not allow content whose origin can't be checked and proved truthful to be viewed by the public eye. The videos which Meta allowed to be shared, can be used as a weapon of negative propaganda and can lead to further escalation of the conflict and the spreading of hatred between two nations that are in war.

Full Comment

Meta should not be allowed to keep the content which origin can't be checked and proved truthful. The videos which Meta let to be shared, can be used as a weapon of negative propaganda and to further escalation of the conflict and spreading of hatred between two nations that are in war. Meta can't be sure whether the soldiers shown in the video are really Azerbaijani soldiers. Whoever made the video wanted to use it as propaganda. We can't know for sure whether the uniforms on the soldiers are genuine or switched. We all know from history how the Soviet Union bombed Russian villages located along the boundaries with Finland using the stolen Finish airplanes as an excuse to declare a war against Finland. This tactic has been used in past by many countries. Therefore, Meta could not know for sure whether the soldiers in the video didn't use the uniform to be able to use the video as a form for negative propaganda and to stop any attempt to the reconciliation for peace. Social media is a tool which is very powerful and therefore there must be rules in place, moreover if social media is used as a military tool. I find unreasonable Meta's argument that they kept the video for raisings awareness about POWs, it's not Meta's job to do that. They made more harm with that than they did good. I myself witnessed the comments and people's reactions to that video and how it caused the escalation of hatred between two ethnicities. During wartimes when the way to reconciliation is so fragile, social media must be banned from using such videos

with the purpose of negative propaganda and further escalation of wars and conflicts

[Link to Attachment](#)

No Attachment

2023-004-FB-MR

Case number

PC-11131

Public comment number

Asia Pacific and Oceania

Region

Oliver

Commenter's first name

Spencer

Commenter's last name

English

Commenter's preferred language

Free Expression Myanmar (FEM)

Organization

Yes

Response on behalf of organization

Short summary provided by the commenter

Meta policies and their application are not fit for purpose for communities in conflict areas. Addressing obligations towards survivors of conflict, such as under IHL, should be narrow and precise to avoid harming the rights of the public and the media in particular. Experiences in Myanmar have been that Meta policies often end up illegitimately restricting the media and the public's right to information about the conflict.

Full Comment

Free Expression Myanmar (FEM) is a national human rights organisation in Myanmar. FEM's comment is in relation to the effects of Meta's decisions relating to imagery of POWs and other individuals caught up in conflict situations. Often such images are published by media, including formal outlets, small-scale journalistic groups, and blogger-journalists. Unlike Myanmar's military State, and its allies, which publish information on Facebook that is aggressive and threatening, media's content on these topics is usually informative. These media intend to share journalistic information with their audiences, in contexts where information is lacking, and much of what is available is violent. In authoritarian States, the online space, and the Facebook platform itself, may be the only public space available and accessible to both media and its audiences. Myanmar media, particularly smaller outlets, often have minimal capacity, and any scant resources are first and foremost invested in journalistic capacity building. They do not have large digital teams, and do not have a detailed understanding of or accessible access to Meta policies. The vast majority of their output is conflict-related, and their role is to inform the public of some of the most grotesque atrocity crimes on a day-to-day basis. Much of the content involves POWs and civilians. As a result, media which are themselves at

high risk, are usually those most working on the edge of Meta policy, and can be the victim of it. At the same time, each Myanmar media's audience is predominantly interested in conflict-related information. POWs, victims of conflict-related crimes, and those accused of "crimes" by the authoritarian State generate significant interest and inform public debate. Many media are not intending to violate privacy but rather believe that they are fulfilling their democratic duty as information providers. Therefore any balance between the rights of the individual featured and the rights of the public is not straightforward. Furthermore, any decisions about that balance are likely to contribute significantly to the direction, nature, and result of the conflict. Many media face repeated issues in relation to Meta's policy application in conflict areas. FEM has supported every single media in Myanmar trying to deal with the application of Meta policy relating to reporting on the conflict. In some of these cases, individual media posts have been taken down by Meta. Taking down an entire post, often because of an attached image, is unnecessary to achieve Meta's intended aim, and disproportionate. It undermines the media's right to freedom of expression, and their audience's right to access information about the conflict. Furthermore, in each case in which a post is taken down, Meta also places a "strike" against the media. As the number of strikes increases, Meta takes action against the entire media. The strikes last a year. A media with several strikes has its audience reach restricted and is not allowed to monetise its content. This has a drastic and damaging effect on the media in conflict areas. Either their ability to be a media is curtailed because they are cut off from funds and audiences, or they start to self-censor. As outlined, the majority of Myanmar's media content is conflict-related, and therefore all outlets, large and small, are constantly dealing with the effect of strikes. It has become one of the largest problems faced by such media. Meta policy needs to better protect the rights of the media in conflict, and better protect the availability of information about the conflict, for the people in that conflict. Individuals, such as POWs, need protecting, but Meta policy needs to be smarter, and decisions relating to restrictions need to be absolutely necessary to address the concern, and proportionate in response. It is in FEM's experience that Meta's decisions are currently not serving the interests of those in conflicts.

[Link to Attachment](#)

No Attachment

2023-004-FB-MR

Case number

PC-11132

Public comment number

Europe

Region

Eric

Commenter's first name

Shovgarian

Commenter's last name

Russian

Commenter's preferred language

DID NOT PROVIDE

Organization

No

Response on behalf of organization

Short summary provided by the commenter

Я считаю, что приоритетное значение имеет жизнь военнопленного.

Full Comment

Благодаря публичному размещению видео с военнопленными: 1. Члены семьи могут узнать, что случилось с ним. После каждой войны большое количество пропавших без вести людей. 2. Информация о военнопленном попадет к компетентным органам и гуманитарным организациям, которые будут заниматься возвращением солдата. 3. Позволит защитить его от смерти, так как все знают, что этот солдат попал в плен. 4. Обратит внимание общества на наличие проблемы с не возвращением военнопленных.

Link to Attachment

No Attachment

2023-004-FB-MR

Case number

PC-11133

Public comment number

Europe

Region

Siranush

Commenter's first name

Sahakyan

Commenter's last name

English

Commenter's preferred language

International and Comparative Law
Center Armenia

Organization

Yes

Response on behalf of organization

Short summary provided by the commenter

We firmly believe that the publication of photo and video materials on social media that depict PoWs should not be prohibited. Regardless of the sensitivity of such content, the public interest in uncovering war crimes, preventing commission of new crimes (torture or arbitrary killings of PoWs), identifying the PoWs (which serves as one of the means of confirming the veracity of video materials, as important piece of evidence), as well as identifying the perpetrators of war crimes prevails over the right to respect for private life.

Full Comment

To begin with, the question as to whether or not PoWs should be exposed to public curiosity (this term also covers the simple disclosure of, inter alia, photos and videos of PoWs) has two main aspects. Firstly, it is a question of preserving the dignity of military personnel. According to international standards, even if PoWs appear to make voluntary public statements or willingly participate in the recording of images, disclosure to the public remains unlawful, as past experience has shown that any decision by a PoW is made in circumstances where their well-being depends entirely on the enemy. It is also considered that having a degree of anonymity in the public eye protects PoWs from being demonized or shamed as individuals. Moreover, the public disclosure of the identities of PoWs can put their lives at risk upon release, as the mere fact that these individuals have surrendered and fallen under the control of the enemy, regardless of the circumstances, can generate violence against not only PoWs, but also their families. The other aspect to be taken into account is the fact that the disclosure of photo and video materials depicting PoWs can and, in practice, has served an important purpose. During and after the 2020 War, the majority of PoWs acknowledged by Azerbaijan were

depicted in photo and video materials taken and spread by Azeri armed forces. This is how the families of PoWs had found out about the captivity of their son/husband/etc., and applied to our organization for bringing their cases before the European Court (ECtHR) of Human Rights. These photos and videos have provided and served as irrefutable evidence in the applications submitted to the ECtHR, which later, in many cases, resulted in Azerbaijan confirming to the ECtHR the captivity of those individuals. Put differently, these materials have acted as a safeguard against unlawful execution, enforced disappearance for those who have already been repatriated or are still in Azerbaijan but have been confirmed by the latter. As for the question whether our organization used those photo and video materials for research, yes, that materials have been incredibly helpful in conducting research and writing reports. They provide valuable evidence to support claims and can be used to provide context to a particular situation. By analyzing these materials, researchers can corroborate witness testimonies, detect locations, identify victims, verify the occurrence of events, and identify those responsible for human rights violations. Moreover, as these materials are publicly available, they can be used to raise awareness and engage the public in advocating for human rights. What concerns to the blurring or hiding of the faces of POWs and other victims, it can potentially put their lives at risk and cause identification issues. While blurring faces in photos and videos of war crimes may seem like a quick solution to protect the identity of victims and witnesses, it can also have significant drawbacks and limitations. In cases where PoWs are being held captive by Azerbaijani side, their identification can be crucial for the purposes of their release or exchange. If their faces are blurred or hidden, it can make it difficult for their families or other relatives to identify them and advocate for their release. Furthermore, blurring can hinder public awareness and accountability for such crimes. Even in cases where the identities of PoWs are known, blurring their faces can hinder efforts to investigate and prosecute war crimes committed against them. The faces of the perpetrators may also be obscured, making it more difficult to identify and hold them accountable for their actions. This can lead to a lack of justice for the victims and impunity for the perpetrators. Therefore, although blurring the faces of PoWs in images and videos may be seen as a way to protect their dignity and privacy, it may also hinder efforts to locate and identify them. In this regard, the Third Geneva Convention maintains transparency in detention operations by requiring states to establish national information bureaus, which **then gather and transmit POWs' personal data to their home states (and families) via the ICRC's Central Tracing Agency. All these provisions related to the foregoing are** very well put and might work in some cases, but the reality of the 2020 War is that when dealing with an aggressor state that does not respect standards of international humanitarian law and international human rights law and presents the repatriation of Armenian PoWs as a "humanitarian act", these mechanisms simply do not work. Unfortunately, not all Armenian PoWs shown in visual

evidence have been confirmed by Azerbaijan. In at least two cases, the PoW shown in the video says out loud his first and last name, which makes it undeniable that these individuals were captured by Azeri armed forces. Yet, even after almost two and a half years later, the fate of these individuals remains unknown. Another important element to consider in addition to the foregoing is that the photo and video materials of Armenian PoWs spread on social media demonstrate serious war crimes and gross violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law. All these videos demonstrate the inhuman and degrading treatment and physical abuse that Armenian PoWs have been subjected to. Other videos show cases of decapitations, mutilation of dead bodies and other violent scenes. While such content is indeed sensitive and disturbing, it practically becomes the only way to prove the committed war crimes against Armenians by Azerbaijan, which the latter has been rejecting. Moreover, some of the videos not only show the Armenian PoWs or fallen combatants but also the servicemen of Azeri armed forces. With this being said it is of paramount importance from a legal perspective to find out and identify the perpetrators of these war crimes.

Link to Attachment

[PC-11133](#)

2023-004-FB-MR

Case number

PC-11134

Public comment number

Europe

Region

Withheld

Commenter's first name

Withheld

Commenter's last name

English

Commenter's preferred language

Withheld

Organization

No

Response on behalf of organization

Short summary provided by the commenter

1. Moderation of content about Armenian POWs. 2. Context of the Azerbaijani aggression against Artsakh and Armenia proper.

Full Comment

1. How such content should be moderated on IG and FB: 1.1. Blur faces of POWs who are on that video. Leave the faces of perpetrators of the crime. Send the original version of the video that doesn't have POW's faces blurred to respective governments and their enforcement agencies + international organizations like the UN Committee against torture, International Red Cross, ECHR, ICJ, Interpol, Europol, etc. so that these crimes can be thoroughly investigated, interested parties are notified and the evidence is preserved. And do that these POWs can be found and brought back home. 1.2. Age restrictions for such content on IG and Facebook 1.3. Allow posts about Armenian war veterans like Monte Melkonyan and Garegin Nzhdeh who are important historical figures and Armenian national heroes without being censored or blocked. 1.4. Allow posts/comments saying that Aliev and Erdogan are war criminals for the crimes their governments committed against Armenian civilians including women and elderly people, kids, POWs in Artsakh and Armenia. Posts about the genocide against Armenians in 1915 done by the Ottoman Empire (modern Turkey), 2020. (Azerbaijan and Turkey). <http://www.genocide-museum.am/eng/index.php> Report by the Tatoyan foundation about Armenophobia in Azerbaijan and Azerbaijani communities abroad: <https://t.co/bjjVcoMuEj> Examples of posts about atrocities committed by Azerbaijan in Artsakh and Armenia: <https://www.cftjjustice.org/violations-committed-by-azerbaijan-9-13-2022-to-now/> CFTJ's report about Armenian POWs and their treatment by Azerbaijan and Turkey: <https://t.ly/Tkm-> Most Armenian POWs to this day haven't been released back home even from the first Artsakh War in 1991 and the Second one in 2020. The

examples of such media are below: 1. azertag.az. 2. news.az 3. apa.az 4. report.az 5. azernews.az 6. trend.az 7. newsalliance.org 8. apnews.com 9. today.az 10. Turan 11. caspiannews.com

1.6. Block Azerbaijani and Turkish users from seeing subscribers and subscriptions on Armenian pages for security reasons. The same way it was done with Ukrainian users. So that they and their loved ones aren't being harassed and blackmailed by Azerbaijani civilians and mercenaries.

2. About Azerbaijan's war against Armenians in Artsakh and Armenia proper (see also Barsegov's book "Nagorno-Karabakh ", volume 1 and 2): <http://gov.nkr.am/en/legal-foundations/>

Azerbaijan has never complied with any of the demands of the UN Security Council, rulings of the ICJ, ECHR including those related to the cessation of hostilities, human rights violations, destruction of Armenian cultural and religious, historic sites. These hostilities are oftentimes on a daily basis. Since December 13, 2022, Azerbaijan has blockaded the Republic of Artsakh. The blockade has been condemned by numerous states on both national, regional and international levels. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/ep-pleinary-humanitarian-consequences-blockade-nagorno-karabakh_en

Immediately before the beginning of the territorial dispute at the beginning of the 20th century, Azerbaijan, instigated by the Turkish nationalist government and supported by Stalin's dictatorship in direct violation of the territorial integrity of the Armenian SSR, annexed Artsakh under the decision of the Caucasian Bureau of the CCRC (b). This annexation had no legal basis both in national and international norms of law and the following 65 years of being part of the Azerbaijan SSR should be regarded as an occupation of Artsakh by Azerbaijan with the direct aid of the Stalinist regime. The regime of state terrorism carried out in Azerbaijani SSR for the purpose of genocide against the Armenian population of Artsakh revived the popular demand to withdraw this Armenian region from the Azerbaijan SSR and transfer it back to the Armenian SSR on the basis of the constitutional principle of the national-territorial structure of the USSR and norms of international law - the right to self-determination. This led to the use of weapons of mass destruction against the population of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh region) by the Azerbaijani and soviet authorities, to the total expulsion of Armenians by the special militia units, to the resumption of acts of genocide against Armenians in Sumgait, Kirovabad, and Baku and ultimately to the expulsion of half a million of the autochthonous Armenian population. Azerbaijan declared its independence in direct violation of the Law on the Procedure for Resolving Issues Related to the Secession of a Union Republic from the USSR, which confirmed the constitutional right of the population of autonomies and areas of compact settlement to independently resolve the issue of their state status. In full compliance with this Law of the USSR, the population of the Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh) republic and the adjoining Shaumian region adopted a decision to restore the Armenian statehood in the form of the NKR by a nationwide vote. (more than 90% of the population voted for independence). Azerbaijan started another full-scale war against the Karabakh Armenians in the 1990s. Azerbaijan has always been pinning

its hopes on a military solution. Condemning the current discriminatory policies of IG and Facebook against Armenian users or those who speak up about atrocities being committed by Azerbaijan against ethnic Armenians in Artsakh and the Republic of Armenia from 2016, 2020-2023, I urge you to take all the necessary measures to ensure the freedom of speech of Armenian users during on IG and Facebook and their right to condemn violent attacks by Azerbaijan and Turkey and their heinous crimes against ethnic Armenian population and Diaspora abroad. Waiting for your prompt and professional response with regard to this matter.

[Link to Attachment](#)

No Attachment

2023-004-FB-MR

Case number

PC-11136

Public comment number

Europe

Region

Jan-Phillip

Commenter's first name

Graf

Commenter's last name

English

Commenter's preferred language

Institute for International Law of Peace
and Armed Conflict, Ruhr University

Organization

Yes

Response on behalf of organization

Short summary provided by the commenter

International humanitarian law, in particular the Third Geneva Convention (GCIII), is applicable to online activities by Meta, a U.S. corporation whose activities in this case are closely linked to the international armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. The individuals allegedly depicted in the video qualify as prisoners of war (POWs) under Article 4 (A) GCIII with Azerbaijan as their detaining power. By deciding to keep a video that depicts at least one POW online and thereby making him identifiable without a compelling public interest justifying this decision, Meta did not act in accordance with its legal obligation and corporate social responsibility to **protect prisoners of war from “public curiosity” under Article 13 GCIII.**

Full Comment

Since the indicated length and the included footnotes are essential to our argument, please find our full brief of no more than five pages as an attachment to this form. We recommend that the maximum document length be coherently indicated throughout this form as this was not the case in previous versions of this submission form.

Link to Attachment

[PC-11136](#)

2023-004-FB-MR PC-11137 Central and South Asia
Case number Public comment number Region

Noor Waheed English
Commenter's first name Commenter's last name Commenter's preferred language

Digital Rights Foundation Yes
Organization Response on behalf of organization

Short summary provided by the commenter

Under IHL and the Geneva Conventions, the safety, dignity and anonymity of POWs is paramount. As such Meta should undertake every measure where possible to blur/pixelate the faces/other identifiable characteristics of POWs in all uploaded content. Not doing so could result in harm to the POW. The Geneva Convention is clear in its language about protecting POWs from "public curiosity". Whilst "public curiosity" is the closest thing in the Conventions to newsworthiness, the two are not equivalent given that Meta's newsworthiness allowance is quite narrow and emphasizes content that has greater public interest value such as for example raising awareness of and documenting war crimes, the benefits of which are acknowledged by the ICRC.

Full Comment

In 2021, according to Human Rights Watch, there were numerous accounts of Azerbaijani forces allegedly abusing Armenian POWs in captivity. Human Rights Watch acknowledged that it was able to verify these accounts partly through videos uploaded on social media and partly through interviews. In light of this, the public interest benefits of being able to upload graphic and disturbing content especially in the context of war and armed conflict are evident especially in terms of raising awareness of and documenting gross human rights violations. That being said, Article 13 (2) of the third Geneva Convention emphasizes that POWs must be protected at all times particularly from acts of violence, intimidation, and against **“insults and public curiosity.”** In order to maintain a balance between reporting, evidence collection and awareness, Meta should ensure that any content depicting POWs is blurred or pixelated to protect the identities of the POWs and the

preservation of their dignity. Using the Geneva Convention as a reference point for the application of international humanitarian law, the closest approximation to **“newsworthiness” can be “public curiosity”, which is not deemed as sufficient** grounds to keep content depicting POWs on its platforms. On the other hand, the Geneva Conventions predated social media-based communication platforms and **the “newsworthiness” exception covers more narrow, public interest aspects than the wider “public curiosity” criteria in the Conventions. Nevertheless, even** instances where uploading content serves a compelling public interest, for example, bringing to public attention gross human rights violations, the content should not disclose the identities of the POWs. The ICRC in its commentary on the third Geneva Convention takes into consideration the existence of social media and makes a special concession in exceptional cases where revealing the identity of the POW is a matter of significant public interest such as for their seniority or if doing so is beneficial to the wellbeing of the POW (i.e. if they are missing). In the absence of this criteria, there are no grounds to leave the face of a POW visible such as in the case of this video. Additionally, Meta should be cognizant of the fact that sharing propaganda videos, even with added or repurposed context has potential for abuse. Any video depicting POWs especially if in the context of propaganda material repurposed for raising awareness should be assessed in terms of its potential to escalate conflict, ability to cause direct or indirect harm to the POW, and impede the dignity of the POWs depicted. It is hence of utmost importance that every possible measure should be taken to conceal the identities of the POWs shown in **posts on Meta’s platforms. Identities of POWs being revealed poses** the threat of inadvertent negative repercussions for POWs once returned to their home countries depending on the culture and military traditions around honor and valor. Being captured and publicly subjected to torture or inhumane treatment may bear subsequent consequences for the POWs and their families. It should be noted that the need to report and share content related to war crimes is not limited to that featuring POWs - **other kinds of war crimes could surpass Meta’s established** community standards for violent, disturbing and graphic content. For such cases, **Meta should keep a cache/database of “violating content” that may be newsworthy** or serve the greater public interest. This content may be better off not circulating on its platforms but nonetheless **should be at Meta’s disposal and should be accessible** in case the need arises to cite the content as evidence of war crimes in an international tribunal or for historical archiving.

Link to Attachment

[PC-11137](#)

2023-004-FB-MR

Case number

PC-11138

Public comment number

Europe

Region

IHL Expert Pool

Commenter's first name

IHL Expert Pool

Commenter's last name

English

Commenter's preferred language

Geneva Academy of International
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights

Organization

Yes

Response on behalf of organization

Short summary provided by the commenter

Concerning how IHL should inform Meta's human rights responsibilities when moderating content depicting prisoners of war, the Geneva Academy recommends **that Meta: o apply its policies concerning PoW, including the Meta's Coordinating Harm and Promoting Crime Community Standard**, in accordance with relevant IHL provisions o use techniques protecting PoW identities in order for relevant content to remain visible on the platform for public interest purposes while safeguarding the safety and dignity of PoW o timely signal and archive any material depicting potential war crimes for further potential investigations and prosecutions o timely archive any material localizing and/or identifying PoW and share it with ICRC and/or other institutions

Full Comment

The Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights wishes to submit a Public Comment (see document attached) to Meta Oversight Board on **How international humanitarian law (also known as the law of armed conflict) should inform Meta's human rights responsibilities when moderating content depicting prisoners of war**. The submission has been prepared in the framework of **the Geneva Academy's IHL Expert Pool**, a response mechanism that works to deliver technical assistance, capacity development and legal opinion on topical IHL issues for users within the human rights community of practice. Launched in 2022, this project works to strengthen the capacity of relevant actors to incorporate IHL into their work in an efficacious and comprehensive manner, by organizing and facilitating the provision of expert advice. Concerning how IHL should inform **Meta's human rights responsibilities when moderating** content depicting prisoners

of war, the Geneva Academy recommends Meta : o To apply its policies concerning **PoW, including the Meta’s Coordinating Harm and Promoting Crime Community Standard**, to all content concerning alleged PoW, including in situations of doubt on the status of the concerned person and irrespective of whether the armed conflict is still ongoing; o To use techniques protecting PoW identities in order to allow content depicting PoW in humiliating or degrading situations to remain visible on the platform for public interest purposes while safeguarding the safety and dignity of PoW and therefore be in accordance with IHL; o To timely signal and archive the material originally posted and all the relevant information for further potential investigations and prosecutions, should the content depict potential war crimes; o To timely archive any material localizing and/or identifying PoW and share it with the ICRC Central Tracing Agency and/or any other competent international or domestic mechanism or institution, as this might be fundamental in preventing enforced disappearances, arbitrary deprivation of life, torture and ill-treatment; o To inform its policies with relevant IHL provisions and implement them accordingly, preventing the company potential liability. Please find attached the full version of the Public Comment by the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights for an exhaustive analysis of applicable law and the impact of relevant provisions.

Link to Attachment

[PC-11138](#)

2023-004-FB-MR

Case number

PC-11139

Public comment number

Europe

Region

Tetiana

Commenter's first name

Avdieieva

Commenter's last name

English

Commenter's preferred language

Digital Security Lab Ukraine

Organization

Yes

Response on behalf of organization

Short summary provided by the commenter

Content moderation policies shall highly depend on the category of cases the company faces and the context in which it operates in the conflict region. When international crimes are expected or widely committed during the conflict, more information shall remain available or, at least, preserved as potential evidence. At the same time, maximum effort shall be taken to maintain the anonymity of PoWs and safeguard them against unnecessary publicity, potential humiliation, or violation of dignity. The warning screen shall be applied to the most violent content depicting gross human rights violations or mass atrocities.

Full Comment

International humanitarian law (IHL) standards. Article 13 of the III Geneva Convention (GC III) protects prisoners of war (PoW) against «acts of violence or **intimidation, ... insults and public curiosity**». **Interpreting this rule**, the ICRC stressed that the publication of PoWs' images is outlawed if individuals can be identified or are depicted in a humiliating manner. In 1991, the British Red Cross Society lawyers noted that the notion of «public curiosity» requires clarification since such publications may serve legitimate public interests of discovering the facts about international crimes and other international law violations. These rules were drafted to protect PoWs from the capturing State, safeguarding against the publication of images by its representatives and media. The rise of online platforms destroyed the capturing State's media monopoly and enabled ordinary users to publish the images of PoW. Such posts occur when civilians observe the capturing and record it, when leaked information is published from private accounts, or if the soldiers themselves publish the process of PoWs capture. In such circumstances,

the classic rules of IHL hardly apply, primarily where the public interest exception covers the impugned content. Indeed, GC III expressly prohibits the depiction of PoWs for propaganda purposes, i.e., where it is done in a humiliating manner and in violation of privacy and dignity. However, the history of modern wars exemplifies the voluntary participation of PoWs in press conferences or interviews disclosing important information on illegal military orders, such as to commit war crimes or crimes against humanity. The Russia-Ukraine war context presented various instances of voluntary publicity of PoWs. Hence, where no dangerous, humiliating, or denigrating circumstances are present, a publication with PoW itself should not be considered in breach of IHL or IHRL. Preservation of evidence and public interest. If no explicit or inferred consent on publication is provided, its acceptability under IHL shall depend purely on the importance of the data contained in the image. For example, if the evidence of maltreatment of the PoWs is recorded, its availability may be crucial for further prosecution of the offenders, while social media may be the only source of such data. Thus, its removal is highly undesirable. Even if the image violates the platform's policies, the platform shall preferably limit access to the publication rather than remove the material. Another instance where removal of publication is undesirable is when a PoW is labeled as «missed», and the social media post may remain the only available information on their status. In this case, knowing the person's fate would be of paramount interest to the public. Mitigating harms for PoW and the audience. DSLU encourages the initiative to hide shocking information with warning screens rather than removing it from the platform entirely. Furthermore, to protect the dignity of PoWs, where alternative versions of the same image or video are available with the faces of PoWs altered, these anonymized versions shall remain available to the general public. At the same time, the original versions shall be archived by platforms for further investigation purposes. If there is explicit consent of PoWs on recording and disclosing the information publicly or it can reasonably be inferred from their behavior, it is unnecessary to cover, blur, or alter faces. This requirement shall also not apply to cases of missed individuals and the apprehension of the military leadership for future trials before a military tribunal. The ICRC likewise supported this approach as an exceptional case under Article 13 of GC III. Moderation principles. Content moderation policies shall highly depend on the category of cases the company faces and the context in which it operates in the conflict region. When international crimes are expected or widely committed during the conflict, more information shall remain available or, at least, preserved as potential evidence. When moderating the content related to PoWs, Meta shall be guided by the following principles: 1) Abstain from removing content depicting PoWs when explicit consent of PoWs on recording and publication is provided or can be reasonably inferred and there is no evidence of inhumane or undignified treatment towards such persons; 2) Depiction of PoWs for propaganda purposes, where they are subjected to torture, inhumane or degrading treatment, shall be prohibited and

removed; 3) Where content depicts international crimes or mass human rights violations, it shall remain available on the platform as evidence with an application of a warning sign on the content's sensitivity; 4) Where numerous versions of the exact depictions are available, the version with the anonymized PoWs shall be preserved on the platform. In contrast, the version disclosing the faces of PoWs shall be removed from the platform but maintained by the company for evidence. It shall remain on the platform if it depicts the missed individual or a person subjected to international justice; 5) Questionable content, or content containing PoWs and qualified as hate speech, calls to violence, or other illegal incitements, shall be removed. It shall likewise be added to the database related to the conflict since the potential evidence of committing atrocities found therein may necessitate its preservation; 6) Meta shall develop comprehensive policies for preserving (notwithstanding removal from platforms for any Community Standards' breaches) and disclosing evidence to the competent authorities investigating international crimes.

Link to Attachment

[PC-11139](#)

2023-004-FB-MR

Case number

PC-11140

Public comment number

Middle East and North Africa

Region

Roger

Commenter's first name

Lu Phillips

Commenter's last name

English

Commenter's preferred language

Syria Justice and Accountability
Centre

Organization

Yes

Response on behalf of organization

Short summary provided by the commenter

SJAC has broad experience documenting war crimes and analyzing videos containing images of POWs related to the Syrian conflict. It provides examples of how Meta's policies would impact war crimes investigations and Missing Persons work.

Full Comment

RE: Armenian prisoner of war video (2023-004-FB-MR) SJAC hereby submits its **response to the Oversight Board's request for public comment in the above case.** The Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC) is a human rights organization that documents war crimes related to the Syrian conflict, preserving and sharing with relevant authorities evidence it has collected in the form of open-source videos, collected testimonies and government documents. Our teams have collected over 2 million videos of potential violations in Syria from social media channels including Youtube and Facebook, and analyzed over 450,000 within our secure database. In general, takedowns of social media videos are a serious concern as this may (1) deprive criminal investigators and prosecutors of relevant evidence; (2) render an incomplete picture of violations being committed; and (3) **undermine attempts to determine the fate of missing persons during and after a conflict.** Meta's policies should take into account the values and principles set forth by International Humanitarian Law (IHL). **It is not clear that Meta's policy on "Coordinating Harm..." is properly crafted to this end. It prohibits "content that reveals the identity or location of a POW in the context of an armed conflict."** Such a policy adheres to the rule to shield POWs from **"public curiosity" and might prevent serious harm to POWs.** However, it might also deprive a family of the opportunity to know the whereabouts of their loved ones. Geneva Convention (III) Arts. 70, 71

enshrines the right of POWs to inform their family members of their capture, address and state of health. If a belligerent does not respect this provision, a video on Facebook may be the only means for a family to learn of the fate of their loved one. This is precisely the kind of information that would be useful to SJAC's search for those rendered missing by ISIS in Syria. Such factors militate in favor of retaining the video in question on the platform. Videos used for propaganda purposes continue to serve important accountability purposes. In a recent investigation, SJAC analyzed dozens of videos recorded and published by the Syrian government targeting civilians in a Damascus suburb with demining weapons. The videos were used by the Syrian Government for propaganda purposes, but were nonetheless useful to establish the violation of IHL and commission of war crimes. Such videos are essential to prove war crimes in criminal justice processes. We know this because we share open-source evidence with prosecutors who are pursuing such cases. Last year, videos were published that had been privately recorded by the Syrian government to document the summary execution of POWs in Tadamon, Syria. Families of missing persons pored over the videos to determine whether their family members were killed in the massacre. Some stepped forward and shared additional information with SJAC. Criminal investigations are currently underway in Europe to support prosecutions that may be undertaken pursuant to Universal Jurisdiction, have led to economic sanctions against those responsible and could be used to support a torture case at the International Court of Justice brought by the Netherlands and Canada. Social media evidence, including videos of POWs, will increasingly be used by courts to prove the elements of war crimes or other human rights abuses. A Senior Legal Advisor at the ICRC has opined that **"Images of POWs or fallen combatants, as well as information identifying them, should be systematically removed from social media platforms to the extent feasible."** It is our view however that a general removal of all such images would undermine very important goals, such as accountability and truth-telling. Images depicting POWs should therefore be preserved at a minimum. The question of whether the identities of POWs should be disclosed publicly, pixelated or removed entirely is more challenging. In SJAC's monitoring of war crimes trials, we have adopted the practice of shielding the identities of victims, but allowing the identities of alleged perpetrators to be disclosed in our public reports. We do this because one of the purposes of public trials is to create transparency, expose wrongdoing and war criminals. We think that this appropriately balances the legitimate interest in shielding victims from public curiosity with the need for transparency and accountability. As applied to the video in question, Meta could keep up the video exhibiting POWs while shielding their faces. The perpetrators faces would not be pixelated. This solution does not address the need for victims' families to be fully informed. Assuming the ICRC is willing, the original videos depicting POWs could be shared with the ICRC teams specific to the country in question and families could then make inquiries with the ICRC about the fates of their loved ones. Meta should

also consider sharing the original videos with civil society organizations specialized in Missing Persons work as regional, cultural and language expertise are essential to understanding the context of such videos. Organizations such as FAFG in Guatemala, EAAF in Argentina, GIJTR in South Africa and SJAC in Syria have specialized knowledge and expertise in Missing Persons work. Meta could explore the creation of regional hubs for the sharing of POW related videos with organizations that maintain databases and consider public requests for information that would be relevant to Missing Persons work as well as potential evidentiary purposes in war crimes cases. SJAC stands ready to assist should you have any questions about the specific application of Meta's policies to real world scenarios.

Link to Attachment

[PC-11140](#)

2023-004-FB-MR

Case number

PC-11141

Public comment number

Europe

Region

Sona

Commenter's first name

Ayvazyan

Commenter's last name

English

Commenter's preferred language

Transparency International
Anticorruption Center

Organization

Yes

Response on behalf of organization

Short summary provided by the commenter

The military attacks of Azerbaijan against the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh in autumn 2020 and the Republic of Armenia in September 2022 led to hundreds of Armenian missing persons, whose fate is not revealed up until now - April, 2023. Additionally, there are several dozens of prisoners of war, who are still kept in Azerbaijan and are subjected to regular torture and ill-treatment. The mentioned types of videos published on social media platforms immensely contribute to the discovering the fate of people gone missing or suffering as well as confirm the existence of PoWs on the Azerbaijani side, which oftentimes they refuse to accept.

Full Comment

In our increasingly vibrant and interconnected digitalized world the images and videos serve as an essential aid to make war criminals accountable for their actions and punish those who give orders to commit violence and crimes. The military attacks of Azerbaijan against the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh in autumn 2020 and the Republic of Armenia in September 2022 led to hundreds of Armenian missing persons, whose fate is not revealed up until now- April, 2023, and existence of dozens of prisoners of war (PoWs), who are still kept in Azerbaijan and are subjected to regular torture and ill-treatment. Given the non-cooperative approach from the Azerbaijani side on returning PoWs and publishing the full list of captives as well as timely handing over all the bodies under their control, this type of videos published on social media platforms immensely contribute to the discovering the fate of people gone missing as a result of the armed conflict as well as confirm the existence of PoWs on the Azerbaijani side, which oftentimes they refuse to acknowledge. Those also help to form a database of evidence triggering

investigation of war crimes both on national and international levels. Most importantly, publication of such content on your platforms has given the relatives of Armenian PoWs and missing persons an opportunity to apply their right to know the fate of their loved ones existing under International Humanitarian Law, as for many times within the past years the videos of inhumane treatment published in social media were the only evidence that the person is alive and is in captivity, which then was used as a tool to make Azerbaijani side acknowledge and confirm the presence of specific persons on their territory, under their control, and help them as possible. Such content has also been used for the purposes of independent investigation of the alleged war crimes to prove and verify the existence of factual grounds of the violations. One example is the Bellingcat - a Netherlands-based investigative journalism group that specializes in fact-checking and open-source intelligence, who exposed and verified the execution of two Armenian persons in Hadrut town, occupied by Azerbaijani army. Taken into account all the mentioned, we strongly believe that the present video under case number 2023-004-FB-MR, depicting Azerbaijani soldiers torturing Armenian PoWs within the context of the recently reignited Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as well as the content of similar **nature are in compliance with the Meta's Seven Strategic Priorities declared by the Oversight Board**, in particular with the second one - Crisis and conflict situations. Posting of the video increases your impact in the area where you can make the biggest difference to how people experience Facebook and Instagram and how it may be used to punish those accountable for war crimes as well as to reveal the fate of people gone missing because of armed conflicts. We would also like to draw your attention on the fact that such type of content was already allowed for several times, including within the context of war in Ukraine, letting to retain the Post by Ukrainian Defense Ministry depicting charred bodies, originally shared as unidentified bodies. Though Meta typically removes this type of content under its Violent and Graphic Content policy, you determined that the mentioned video qualified for a newsworthy allowance, as it documented an ongoing armed conflict. Given the above-mentioned, we would urge you to grant same transparent approach towards war crimes committed by Azerbaijanis during the Nagorno-Karabakh armed conflict and recent episodes of Azerbaijani aggression towards Armenia and Armenians. In our view, the videos depicting the ill-treatment of soldiers and civilian population during the Nagorno-Karabakh armed conflict can be published due to the newsworthiness allowance introduced by Meta in October 2016, as the content surfaces an imminent threat to public health or safety and can be deemed appropriate given one of the factors you consider when evaluating the content, such as the Country-specific circumstances (for example, whether there is an election underway, or the country is at war).

[Link to Attachment](#)

No Attachment

2023-004-FB-MR

Case number

PC-11144

Public comment number

Central and South Asia

Region

Igor

Commenter's first name

Mirzakhanyan

Commenter's last name

English

Commenter's preferred language

DID NOT PROVIDE

Organization

No

Response on behalf of organization

Short summary provided by the commenter

The PoW related content should be allowed on Meta platforms for their substantial value of the preservation of human lives and evidential contribution for the fights against impunity for the most serious crimes. However, for the sake of balancing these against the possible harm to general public and individuals concerned, a prompt moderation of such content is required be it in a form of limiting audience to targeted stakeholders or restricted access for general users. If put in IHL terminology, maybe Meta should become the new form of Protecting Power reintroducing its meaning under the Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War?!

Full Comment

Please see the attached file.

Link to Attachment

[PC-11144](#)

2023-004-FB-MR

Case number

PC-11145

Public comment number

Europe

Region

Anna

Commenter's first name

Melikyan

Commenter's last name

English

Commenter's preferred language

Protection of Rights without
Borders NGO

Organization

Yes

Response on behalf of organization

Short summary provided by the commenter

Videos shall be posted and not removed as there are compelling interests. permitting these videos to remain on social media platforms, among others, served the imperative to protect them from even greater harm that public curiosity – as a safeguard that they would remain alive, would not be killed as the fact of their captivity is evidenced by videos taken by perpetrators themselves, hence we have an overriding legitimate interest of ensuring the right to life versus protecting from public curiosity in case videos with torture and ill-treatment are posted.

Full Comment


Article 13 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 aims to protect POWs, stating that **‘prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity’**. According to the updated Commentary of the Third Geneva Convention 1949, any materials that enable individual prisoners to be identified must be presumed to subject them to public curiosity and, therefore, may not be transmitted, published or broadcast. If there is a public interest in revealing the identity of a prisoner (for instance, owing to their **seniority or because they are wanted for prosecution**) or if it is **in the prisoner’s vital interest to do so** (for example, when they go missing), the identifying material may **exceptionally be released, but only insofar as it respects the POWs’ dignity**. Likewise, images of prisoners in humiliating or degrading situations may not be transmitted, published or broadcast unless there is a compelling public interest in doing so (for instance, bringing serious violations of IHL to public attention) and the images do not disclose the identities of the individuals concerned. We are aware of **the ICRC’s calls on media outlets to apply appropriate professional practices and exercise restraint to help ensure that captured and killed combatants benefit from**

the protections owed to them under the international law of armed conflict. The ICRC also called on social media companies to take measures to prevent unlawfully disclosed images and information from circulating on their platforms. As explained by the ICRC, the prohibition of exposing POWs to public curiosity is driven by two concerns: the desire to preserve the dignity of military personnel who have surrendered or been captured, and the imperative to protect them from harm during their captivity and upon their release. In cases depicting parading POWs through the streets and distributing images of their corpses as propaganda, or disclosure of images of POWs, recordings of interrogations or private conversations, personal correspondence, and any other private data would definitely violate the rule and expose them to public curiosity. This would also include cases when POWs are interviewed, speak at press conferences or are filmed when contacting their families and making propagandistic statements. Azerbaijan resorted to this practice as well. In these cases, social media shall comply with the rule as suggested by the ICRC. Another concern in other contexts, not in Armenia, is that the public disclosure of identities of individual POWs can put their lives at risk upon release. In the context of war, the simple fact of having surrendered or been captured can be enough to motivate violence against POWs and their families. If this is the case (based on feedback/reports from interested parties or other sources of credible information), social media shall take measures to prevent this. This means that response shall be also context-specific. The purpose of the prohibition must be balanced against compelling interests. In the case in question as well as in hundreds of similar instances documented by our organizations, footage depicts the worst treatment of POWs, including torture. According to our observations, in the majority of cases, permitting these videos to remain on social media platforms, among others, served the imperative to protect them from even greater harm that public curiosity – as a safeguard that they would remain alive, would not be killed as the fact of their captivity is evidenced by videos taken by perpetrators themselves, hence we have an overriding legitimate interest of ensuring the right to life versus protecting from public curiosity in case videos with torture and ill-treatment are posted. Under the Third Geneva Convention 1949, the Detaining power has the obligation to communicate information about captivity and other relevant information through its national information bureau to POWs home states (and **families**) via the ICRC's Central Tracing Agency. There would not be any need to keep videos with POWs posted for the purposes of establishment of their fate and whereabouts – being in captivity – if the detaining power complied with this obligation. However, the Detaining authority – Azerbaijan, has failed to comply with its obligations in dozens of cases. In most of the cases when similar videos appeared online, the families were able to identify their next-to-kin, and lawyers applied to the ECHR with a request for interim measures to safeguard the life and security of the captives. More specifically, during the hostilities in 2020 and in the following months, the ECHR applied interim measures under Rule 39 with regard to at least

229 Armenians who reportedly fell in custody of the Azerbaijani armed forces during and in the immediate aftermath of the 44-day war, however the Government of Azerbaijan failed to acknowledge the capture and whereabouts of some them, in some cases – to-date. In most of these cases, videos published by perpetrators or people affiliated with them served as the key and often only evidence for the Court to grant interim measures to protect life and security of the POWs and civilians detained in the context of armed conflict as the Azerbaijani Government failed to official notify or acknowledge their capture either to the family members, the Armenian Government or other interested parties. According to the repatriated POWs interviewed by our organization, in some cases their detention was not acknowledged by Azerbaijan for months, the ICRC was not able to visit them, and the family learned that they were in captivity only because a video depicting ill-treatment of the POW in question by Azerbaijani servicemen was posted on social media. This allowed the family to immediately apply to the European Court and seek interim measures of protection.

Link to Attachment

[PC-11145](#)



Public Comment Appendix for
2023-004-FB-MR

Case number

End of public comments